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Abstract 
We conduct a regional analysis of the relationship between market concentration and 
price dynamics in the grocery retail sector, focusing on a sample of five categories of goods 
belonging to the 12 COICOP aggregation and on a panel of countries that includes Germany, 
Spain, Finland, Italy, Austria and Portugal. Using a unique census-type dataset on retailers, 
we construct Herfindahl-Hirschman indices of concentration at the buying group, parent 
company and individual shop level for a sample of 118,540 large grocery stores and we 
study the association between these measures and regional price changes. Our results point 
to a positive association between retail market concentration and price growth in food and 
beverages, alcohol and tobacco and miscellaneous goods in the time span 2003-2010 at the 
buying, parental group and store level for the pooled sample of countries. The relation 
reverses sign for clothing and footwear and household equipment. This evidence is robust to 
different specifications of concentration indices. 
JEL Classification: L1, L4, L8, E31. 
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The distributive trades sector provides an ‘intermediation’ service between upstream (e.g. 
producers)  and  downstream  economic  agents  (e.g.  consumers).  Therefore,  it  influences  the 
functioning of the market economy as a whole and is especially relevant to monetary policy because 
of its crucial role in price formation. From a monetary policy point of view, increasing the degree of 
competition  in  the  distributive  trades  sector  may  have  effects  not  only  on  price  levels,  via  a 
reduction  of  mark-ups,  but  also  on  price  dynamics,  through  higher  price  flexibility.  Structural 
features of the compartment, such as the role of buying groups
2 and the relative bargaining power 
between producers and retailers, are of great importance to consumers and price determination. In 
addition, they may also affect the measurement of consumer prices. 
In this paper, we conduct a regional analysis of the relationship between the degree of retail 
market concentration and price dynamics for five categories of goods, selected for their availability 
on retail shelves, classified according to the 12 COICOP aggregation (1. food and non-alcoholic 
beverages; 2. alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; 3. clothing and footwear; 5. furnishings, 
household  equipment  and  routine  household  maintenance;  12.  miscellaneous  goods).  Data  are 
available for Germany, Spain, Finland, Italy, Austria and Portugal.
3  
By assembling a unique census-type dataset on large-scale retailers (Nielsen structural data), 
we  construct  Herfindahl-Hirschman  indices  (HHI)  of  concentration  at  the  buying  group,  parent 
company and individual store level, considering both the regional and local market (5 km radius) 
definition. We investigate the relationship between these measures of concentration and patterns in 
price changes at a regional level.  
The  original  contribution  of  this  study  lies  in  the  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
competition and price changes at the local level, using cross-country micro data. Our result points to 
an overall positive and statistically significant relationship between retail market concentration and 
price  growth  for  the  pooled  sample  of  countries,  using  the  regional  and  local  concentration 
measures  for  food  and  beverages,  alcohol  and  tobacco  and  miscellaneous  goods  and  services. 
Instead,  price  changes  are  negatively  affected  by  the  degree  of  concentration  for  clothing  and 
footwear and furnishings, and household equipment and maintenance. 
                                                 
1 The bulk of this research project was done while the authors were involved in the drafting of the Eurosystem Structural Issues Report, published in 
the ECB Occasional Paper Series, September 2011. We are grateful to Robert Anderton, Aidan Meyler, Patrick Sevestre and Philip Vermeulen for 
valuable comments. We are also indebted to Eugenio Gaiotti, Andrea Brandolini and Roberto Sabbatini. All errors are our own. The views expressed 
in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
2 A buying group is an organisation of retailers that combines the bargaining power of its members in order to be able to purchase goods at a more 
advantageous rate than might be achieved through individual negotiation. Buying groups are important because, by combining the bargaining power 
of their individual members, they can achieve a very large scale and potentially alter the balance of power in negotiations between retailers and 
suppliers. Their existence also implies that measures of competition based on company level data may overstate the true level of competition and 
understate their bargaining power relative to suppliers.  
3 CPI regional data were not available for the other EA countries.   6 
It is important to note that the Nielsen structural data used for the concentration indices refer 
to the year 2010, while we look at price changes between 2003 and 2010. Although it would clearly 
be preferable to have data about the retail trade market structure over the same time span, one can 
reasonably expect that the differences in these structures across regions and countries dominate 
their evolution over time so that the retail trade market structure in 2010 remains informative about 
price changes over the whole period. However, the very fact of having regional Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) data - instead of price levels - makes the link with the concentration measures and the 
interpretation of the results less immediate. 
Indeed, most of the industrial organisation literature looks at the well-established relation 
between competition and price levels (see for instance Clarke and Davis, 1982; Hausman and Sidak, 
2007),  finding  that  a  more  competitive  market  structure  implies  lower  prices  and  enhances 
consumer welfare (Dobson and Waterson, 1997, 1999; Chen, 2003; Barros et al., 2006; Villas-Boas, 
2009). In the macroeconomic theoretical literature, many papers have investigated the association 
between the frequency of price adjustments and the degree of monopoly power, showing a positive 
relation  between  the  absence  of  price  changes  and  monopoly  power  and,  conversely,  between 
frequent price changes and strong competition. Based on price level records collected to compute 
the Italian CPI, merged with retail trade data released by Nielsen for the years 2003-2008, Ciapanna 
and Colonna (2011) have assessed the effect of concentration on price levels in the Italian retail 
market. They find that concentration and prices tend to co-move in the same direction when looking 
at the parental group and at the store level, whereas they tend to be negatively related at the buying 
group level. The approach used below is similar to that adopted in Ciapanna and Colonna (2011) 
but, due to data availability, on the one hand, the paper focuses on price dynamics rather than price 
levels, on the other hand, the analysis is conducted on a panel of countries, representing over 60 per 
cent of the euro-area GDP. Very few contributions have analysed the relation between the degree of 
product market concentration and inflation (see for instance, Scitovsky, 1978; Benabou, 1992). In 
this literature, a more competitive economy is expected to adjust more quickly to unanticipated 
shocks, reducing, for instance, the response of inflation after a supply shock. Przybila and Roma, 
(2005) find that the extent of product market competition, as proxied by the level of mark-up, is an 
important driver of inflation for a panel of EU countries. 
The outline of the paper is the following: in Section 1 we document some stylised facts on 
the distributive trades sector, in Section 2 we provide a description of the dataset, in Section 3 we 
present  the  mathematical  methods  employed  to  construct  the  concentration  indices.  The 
econometric  analysis  and  results  are  discussed  in  Section  4;  Section  5  concludes  and  proposes 
possible extensions.   7 
1. Some stylised facts about the structure of the distributive trades sector 
 
According to the NACE Rev. 1.1 classification, the distributive trades sector (G) covers 
three broad areas: motor vehicles (G50), wholesale trade (G51) and retail trade (G52) and accounts 
for approximately 30 per cent of firms in the non-financial business sector in the euro area
4, ranging 
from a minimum of 23 per cent in Finland to a maximum of 34.5 per cent in Portugal
5 (Eurostat 
Structural Business Statistics, SBS, 2007). This variation partly represents differences in average 
firm size across countries and sectors (firms are on average smaller in Mediterranean countries and 
larger in Northern countries). In terms of labour market characteristics, the distributive trades sector 
accounts for a high percentage of the self-employed (about 30 per cent of the total employment) and 
part-time workers, as well as young and female workers. On average, a large portion of low-skilled, 
low-productivity, and consequently low paid labour workers are employed in this sector, which also 
accounts for a significant proportion of new jobs created over the last 15 years. During the period 
we analyse, large firms have generated much of the growth in turnover and employment witnessed 
by this historically fragmented sector, reflecting its gradual consolidation. 
About 60 per cent of the distributive trade firms belong to the retail sub-sector, which is also 
the most analysed in the economic and business literature (Euromonitor International, 2000-2010; 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2000). According to Euromonitor data, the total number of grocery stores 
in the euro area is about 850,000: both Italy and Spain have more stores than Germany despite their 
smaller populations. As to the sales area, Germany (40 million sqm) has the largest of in the euro 
area (150 million sqm). This inverse correlation captures a striking divide in European grocery: 
Southern  European  countries  (Spain,  Italy,  and  Portugal)  tend  to  have  more  traditional  smaller 
grocery  retailers  than  most  Northern  and  Central  ones  included  in  our  sample  (Germany  and 
Finland). 
2. Data Description 
 
The econometric analysis is based on a unique dataset, constructed by merging the structural 
Nielsen data with the regional consumer price  index (CPI) provided by the National Statistical 
Institutes for Germany, Spain, Finland, Italy, Austria and Portugal and the Eurostat regional data.  
                                                 
4 The non-financial business sector comprises of the total economy excluding agriculture and fishing, financial intermediation services, and public 
services sectors. Thus, it includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, utilities, construction, distributive trades, hotels and restaurants, transport, 
storage and communication, and real estate, renting and business activities. 
5 The shares for the other countries considered in this study are 26.2 per cent in Germany, 30.1 in Spain, 31.8 in Italy and  27.9 in Austria.   8 
2.1 Nielsen structural data 
 
The structural data consists of census-type data on non-specialised large grocery retailers
6 
released  by  ACNielsen  for  nine  euro-area  countries  (Germany,  Spain,  Finland,  France,  Greece, 
Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Austria  and  Portugal)  and  provided  by  the  Belgian  Central  Bank  for 
Belgium.
7 The reference period is July 2010. The data provide a picture of the grocery retail sector 
updated at the first semester of 2010. The unit of observation is the store, for a total of 114,815 
observations (118,540 including Belgian shops; see Table 1). Detailed information at the store level 
is provided in the dataset: name, address, banner name, outlet type, sales area in square metres, 
number of counters, turnover share.  Moreover, the dataset is endowed with information about 
whether each store belongs to a parental company and/or to a buying group.
8  
To construct a dataset harmonized across countries some data management was required. 
The outlet type definition was not the same for all countries.
9 The harmonization criterion chosen 
was based on the sales surface range applicable to most of the countries: 
·  superettes (100-400 sqm), 
·  supermarkets (400-2500 sqm), 
·  hypermarkets (2500 and over). 
Malls (SB-Warenhaus in Germany, Grand Magasin in France, for example) were excluded from the 
final  dataset  for  overlapping  and  comparability  reasons.  For  discounts  a  dummy  variable  was 
present in most of the Nielsen datasets. Where it was not specified, NCB task force members were 
asked to construct the dummy, or a criterion based on the banner name (whenever possible) was 
used. 
As to the geographical dimension, many countries were provided with a more aggregated 
detail (NUTS2 in Table 1).
10 The geographical detail is not an issue when considering the Nielsen 
dataset by itself, as the address of the single store is available. The problem arises when we merge 
the very detailed store level information with the regional (NUTS2) CPI data (see Section 3). In this 
sense, we needed to transpose the former to the latter (broader) aggregation, as in Spain and Finland 
for example. For other countries, like Italy, provided with both NUTS2 and NUTS3 dimension, the 
regional analysis was based on NUTS2, as the Eurostat additional explanatory variables (labour cost 
                                                 
6 NACE G5211 sub-sector, non-specialised stores with food beverages or tobacco predominating. Small traditional as well as specialized stores are 
not included. 
7 Data for Belgium relate to 2008.   
8 For Greece, buying groups were imputed from an external data source provided by the NCB SIR task force member. 
9 See http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/hypermarche.htm and 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/methodes/default.asp?page=definitions/supermarche.htm as an example. 
10 NUTS denotes Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics. There are three hierarchies, with 97 NUTS1 regions, 271 NUTS2 regions and 1,303 
NUTS3 regions in the European Union. In principal, NUTS2 regions should have a population in the range 800,000 to 3 million, and NUTS3 regions 
in the range 150,000 to 800,000. However, as countries often use existing administrative zones, this is only an indication rather than a precise guide.   9 
index, real GDP growth rate) were available at this level only, despite a very detailed regional CPI 
at the NUTS3. For some other countries, such as Belgium and Greece, the NUTS2 aggregation has 
been retrieved through the zip codes. 
In order to provide the final dataset with a parent company and a buying group for each 
country some assumptions were made. Where not provided in the original dataset, we assumed that 
the buying group for the hard discounters at the national level coincided with the global banner 
name. We also allowed the parent company to provide some insight regarding the buying group 
when missing. 
Finally,  for  very  few  countries  (Austria,  Germany,  France  and  Italy)  a  measure  of  the 
turnover share was available. 
2.2 Regional CPI data 
 
We include in the dataset sectoral CPI data at the regional level from six euro-area countries 
(Germany (DE), Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Austria and Portugal (PT) and Spain (ES)), 69 regions 
(NUTS2), covering about 65 per cent of the euro area in terms of GDP.  For each region we have 12 
product  categories,  corresponding  to  the  12  COICOP  classification:  1.  food  and  non-alcoholic 
beverages; 2. alcoholic  beverages, tobacco  and  narcotics; 3.  clothing  and footwear; 4. housing, 
water, electricity, gas and other fuels; 5. furnishings, household equipment and routine household 
maintenance; 6. health; 7. transport; 8. communication; 9. recreation and culture; 10. education;  11. 
restaurants and hotels; 12. miscellaneous goods. We rule out all the categories including mainly 
services or energy goods, while keeping those products plausibly sold in the outlets classified under 
NACE 5211. Therefore, the sectors we are interested in are:  
1. food and non-alcoholic beverages (food);  
2. alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics (alco);  
3. clothing and footwear (clot);  
5. furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance (furn);  
12. miscellaneous goods (other). 
Overall, the dataset includes 240 series, spanning the period 2003 to 2010 at annual frequency.  
The rate of price change in a given region i and sector j at time t denoted by pijt is computed 
as the year-on-year percentage change in the respective sectoral price index, cpiijt,  
pijt = (cpiijt- cpiijt-1)/ cpiijt-1         (1)      
In  the  empirical  model,  we  include  some  control  variables  from  the  Eurostat  regional  dataset 
(NUTS2). These are the regional density (population/km
2) and a measure of the evolution of labour 
costs. For the latter we selected labour compensation, regional GDP (both in nominal terms and in   10 
PPS) and real value added growth. These three variables were all highly correlated with each other, 





3.1 Concentration measures 
 
The  concept  of  industry  concentration  and  the  construction  of  indices  measuring 
concentration  has  been  widely  analysed  in  the  economic  literature.  The  two  elements  that 
characterize these measures are: number of firms and equality/inequality of market shares. 
Whenever such indicators are used, it is implicitly assumed that the degree of competition of 
a market structure is higher, the lower is the share of demand served  by  each firm. The most 
common concentration measures are the concentration ratios, which are employed to detect changes 
in the distribution of market shares due to entry/exit of firms or M&As. The general form, common 
to all concentration measures is: 
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where  i s   is firm i market share,  i w  is the corresponding weight attributed to the market share i and 
n  is  the  number  of  firms  operating  in  the  market.  The  most  popular  synthetic  indices  used  in 
investigations by antitrust authorities are:  
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is the sum of the k largest firms’ market shares, which are given equal weight. There exists a bi-
univocal  correspondence  between  k CR   and  the  points  of  the  concentration  curve  (discrete 
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2.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): 
                                                 
11 The results are left unchanged the other two measures are considered.    11 











+ < < -
= " =
i i i
n i s w i i  





, where the minimum is attained in the case of perfect competition, whereas the 
maximum implies a monopolistic market structure. 
The k-firm Concentration Ratio suffers some limitations due to the arbitrariness in the choice of 
k and the bias induced by excluding the other n-k firms. On the other hand, HHI is the most popular 
measure; it represents the reference market power index in the antitrust authority guidelines when 
evaluating M&As.
12 In what follows, we use HHI as our concentration measure. 
3.2 Construction of concentration measures  
To evaluate the degree of concentration in the retail sector in the main euro area countries 
(Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), 
the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES)), we compute the HHI using the Nielsen structural 
data for 2010 described in Section 2.1. Concentration is evaluated both at the buying group level, 
and in the final market, among parent companies and stores.  
We first compute the indices at the national level, in order to provide a broad picture of how 
concentrated the retail market is, looking at the whole country. However, measures of concentration 
computed at the national level may be inaccurate or, at least, should be complemented by local level 
indices, particularly when they are used to proxy market power. Different studies have pointed out 
the  relevance  of  measuring  local  level  competition  in  the  distributive  trades  sector,  because 
consumers may get information and compare relative prices for a restricted set of stores according 
to a vicinity criterion (see, for instance, Baugnet et al., 2009). In this respect, HHI at the national 
level is a poor indicator of actual (absence of) competition, as it would be the same as assuming that 
all the stores in a country compete with each other. On the other hand, an HHI calculated at local 
level  may  also  present  some  shortcomings  as  high  concentration  levels  may  just  reflect  small 
market size. In this respect, the association between the optimal number of competitors and the 
market size, measured by population (or population density), may be led by a spurious correlation. 
                                                 
12 In particular, in the US, a post-merger scenario characterized by an  18 . 0 £ HHI  and an increase in the same index of less than 0.02 is considered 
immune from the risk of abuse of market power. Whenever these limits are exceeded, an investigation can be initiated.  
   12 
The definition of the relevant local market is subject to discussion (see, for example, Cotterill, 
2007; Perdiguero and Borrel, 2008). Here, we follow a similar approach to that in Baugnet et al. 
(2009), checking the robustness of our results to alternative definitions. In particular, we will define 
a regional market as the set of stores belonging to the same region (NUTS2 classification) and a 
local market for each store as the set of competitors in a 5 and 10 kilometre radius.
13  
3.2.1 National level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
 
The geographical reference is the whole country, which also represents the reference market 
in  this  case.  Market  shares  are  constructed  based  on  sales  area  (square  metres),  aggregated  by 
buying and parental groups.
14 To calculate the HHI, we sum the total square metres of all outlets 
belonging to the same buying (respectively parental) group and divide the result by the sum of all 
square metres sales in the country. Finally, we multiply this measure by 100 to recover the index. 
Table 2 shows that the Finnish and Austrian retail sectors are the most concentrated at the 
buying group level, while Italy and France are the most fragmented.  
In particular, Finland and Austria both have the first two buying groups with a market share 
in the range of 30-50 per cent (see Table 3). In Finland, the largest buying group, including only the 
largest parent company in the country, represents a share of 45.9 per cent, the highest in the sample; 
more than one third of the remaining market share belongs to the second buying group, including 
the second parent company and other independent retailers. The first and second Austrian buying 
groups  account  for  a  market  share  above  one  third,  the  former  including  many  discounters  as 
members, while the latter being represented by its own banner retailers. The Italian market structure 
shows a much more fragmented landscape; the biggest buying group is the only one representing 
more than 20 per cent, whereas the ones from the third to the sixth have a share of about 10 per 
cent. A relatively fragmented market structure is typical of Portugal as well: the first buying group 
holds  a  25  per  cent  share,  while  the  second  has  21.4  per  cent.  The  other  countries  occupy  an 
intermediate  position  in  the  buying  group  level  concentration  ranking.  In  particular,  Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands have only one buying group with a market share of about one third; 
while in France and Spain the first buying group holds a share of 25 and 28 per cent, respectively.  
The market structure at the parent company level provides a broader classification among 
countries:  Finland  and  Germany  have  the  most  concentrated  retail  sector,  and  together  with 
Belgium well above the euro-area average; Italy and Austria show a low degree of concentration 
                                                 
13 Previously, we computed geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude) using the precise address available in the dataset. Bulkgeocoder.com 
was used for these purposes. 
14 Counters and turnover shares are other possible criteria that can be employed to construct market shares. However, we use square metres, because 
sales area data are available for all the countries in the dataset. Whenever possible, we computed the same measure based on the three indicators and 
find a correlation larger than 0.9. Thus, we conclude that square meters are a good synthetic indicator for market shares.   13 
(see Table 2). In further detail, about 70 per cent of the Finnish market share belongs to the first two 
largest parent companies (40 and 34 per cent respectively; Table 4). In Germany, more than one 
third of the retail sector is accounted for by the first parental group, about one fourth by the second 
one. The Italian market structure appears more fragmented, as the first two parent companies hold a 
20 per cent share only, about 10 per cent each. An interesting picture emerges from the Austrian 
retail  sector,  much  concentrated  at  the  buying  group  level  and  very  fragmented  at  the  parent 
company level, where the first group accounts for more than 15 per cent of the market share, while 
the second and third for about 10 per cent each. There is one main parent company with a market 
share of about 20 per cent in Greece, Belgium and Spain. In Portugal the first two companies cover 
a market share of about 40 per cent, while in France there are about fifty parental groups and the 
first two largest hold about 30 per cent of the market. 
3.2.2 Regional level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
 
The methodology we employed to compute the regional level HHI indices resembles the 
one described in Section 3.2.1, with the difference that now the reference market is the region 
(NUTS2)  and  not  the  whole  country.  The  market  share  is  constructed  accordingly,  taking  as 
denominator the sum of the sales floor (square metres) in the region and as the numerator the same 
sales area further disaggregated by buying group, parental group or simply by shop.  
As reported in Table 5, in Finland, the most concentrated country at the buying and parental 
group level, among the mainland, Itä-Suomi is the least competitive region.
15 Vorarlberg shows the 
highest concentration for Austrian buying groups and the Tirol for both the parent companies and 
shops; the German retail market structure, at both levels, is very concentrated in Sachsen-Anhalt. In 
Italy the Lombardia region tends to be the most competitive in the country with respect to all three 
of the measures considered. Excluding Corsica, in France, the Ile-de-France buying groups are the 
most  concentrated,  whereas  for  parent  companies  and  shops  it  is  Pays-de-la-Loire.  Spanish 
concentration  is  high  in  Extremadura  at  the  buying  group  level  and  in  Pais  Vasco  for  parent 
companies  and  shops.  The  Belgian  “province  du  Brabant  Wallon”  and  the  Greek  “Anatoliki 
Makedonia Thraki” show the highest level of concentration in the country. Noord-Holland, the isles 
that includes also Amsterdam, is more concentrated compared with Drenthe, the least concentrated 
Dutch region. Lisboa shows a high level of concentration in Portugal at the shop level.  
                                                 
15 All the islands in the sample (Ahvenanmaa (FI), Corsica (FR), Ionia Nisia (GR), Voreio Aigaio (GR), Notio Aigaio (GR)) can be considered  
outliers, as the mean number of shops is smaller compared with the average for the country they belong to. Ionia Nisia, Notio Aigaio and Voreio 
Aigaio have 24, 30, 19 shops, compared with 300, the Greek mean number of stores per region.   14 
3.2.3 Local level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
 
To retrieve the 5 km and 10 km radius bilateral distances between stores, we computed 
geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude) using the store address (street name and zip code) 
available in the Nielsen structural dataset (see Table 6). We used the same address information to 
define a local market for each store to account for all potential competitors inside different distance 
radii.  Then  to  match  the  CPI  data  aggregation,  a  regional  average  at  the  NUTS2  detail  was 
calculated. 
These concentration measures were computed at the store level and therefore they might not 
be an accurate measure of concentration whenever the stores belong to the same parent company (as 
they do not effectively compete with each other). Since this information is also available in the 
Nielsen dataset, we can compute similar measures of concentration, aggregating market shares of 
those stores belonging to the same parental group. We also retrieve the same measure at the buying 
group level to account for shops belonging to the same buyer consortium. 
The definition of the relevant local market may vary across store types. In particular, it is 
likely that the relevant local market for a hypermarket is larger than the one for a small superette. 
To assess this issue, we computed HHI regional averages using different local markets depending 
on the store size. So, for hypermarkets (above 2500 sqm) we take the HHI computed at the 10 km 
radius local market and for supermarkets and superettes the individual HHI is taken from the 5 km 
radius local market.  
The regional ranking does not vary according to this alternative measure, so, in the model, 
we kept the 5 km measure for convenience of exposition. The latter was used in the robustness 
check of the model presented in Section 4. 
4. Empirical model and results 
 
We model the year-on-year percentage change in the sectoral price index as follows: 
ijt i i i i
i i it ijt
HHIS DuCOICOP HHIP DuCOICOP
HHIB DuCOICOP Ducountry Duyear X
e b b
b b b b b p
+ +
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  (6) 
where the indices i, j and t respectively indicate the region, the COICOP category and the year. 
Our main variable of interest is the Herfindahl Hirschman index – which is available for 
2010 only – computed at three different levels of the trade sector: 
1) for  buying groups (HHIB),  
2) for  parental groups (HHIP) and  
3) for  stores (HHIS).   15 
Moreover, two versions of these indices have been considered: the first one measures the 
concentration at the regional level (Section 3.2.2), while the second one provides a more local 
measure of concentration as it is the average of sub-indices computed for narrow zones, defined as 
the set of stores operating within a 5 (or 10) km radius (Section 3.2.3).  
In  order  to  take  into  account  possible  differences  across  product  categories,  the 
concentration indices have been interacted with product dummies (for the five COICOP categories 
of interest). The model also includes country fixed effects (Ducountry) and year dummies (Duyear). 
The latter aims to capture the common component in price changes in a given year (commodity 
prices,  exchange  rate,  global  economic  cycle,  monetary  stance,  etc.).  Xit    is  a  vector  of  other 
explanatory variables having a regional and a time varying component, specifically the regional 
population density and a measure of the evolution of local labour costs. The errors are clustered by 
region.  
The model above, comprising the three measures of concentration (HHIB, HHIP and HHIS), 
allows us to assess the respective impact of these different aspects of trade sector concentration. 
Unfortunately, as far as the regional analysis is concerned, HHIC and HHIB appear to be strongly 
correlated, with a correlation coefficient of about 0.8, reflecting an almost one-to-one mapping of 
the parental groups to the buying groups for many countries (see also Section 3.2.1). Most countries 
in the sample show a very high correlation between the two measures so that a collinearity problem 
arises in considering HHIB and HHIP together, which does not allow a proper assessment of their 
respective impact. The correlation between HHIB and HHIS on one side, and HHIP and HHIS on 
the other side is instead very weak (0.3 and 0.2, respectively). Therefore, the model estimated in the 
empirical analysis becomes: 
ijt i i
i i it ijt
HHIS DuCOICOP
HHIB DuCOICOP Ducountry Duyear X
e b
b b b b b p
+




4 3 2 1 0
  (7) 
The main results of the regression, based on the indices computed according to the regional 
aggregation criterion, are summarized in Table 7. When considering the HHI at the buying group 
level, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 10 per cent for food and beverages 
and at 1 per cent for alcohol and tobacco and for miscellaneous goods and services. It is negative 
and statistically significant for clothing and footwear and furnishings and household equipment and 
maintenance (column 2 in Table 7). The interpretation of these findings is that a higher degree of 
market concentration at the buying group level (many retailers joining together in large purchasing 
consortia), although increasing each retailer’s bargaining power towards producers, does not seem 
to  have  been  always  associated  with  more  moderate  price  dynamics  (countervailing  power 
hypothesis, see, for instance, Galbraith, 1952; Chen, 2003; Ciapanna and Colonna, 2011; Mills,   16 
2011).  Thus,  we  do  not  observe  a  welfare-enhancing  effect  for  consumers  for  these  product 
categories. There are various plausible economic explanations of this result. On the one hand, it 
could reflect collusive behaviour between a dominant producer and its counterpart buying group; 
alternatively, it could be driven by a relatively low demand elasticity for local products in those 
regions where we observe higher buying group concentration. In this case, independently of the 
producer’s bargaining power (and even in a perfectly competitive upstream market) there is no 
incentive for the retailer to share its surplus with the consumer, and the intermediary would practice 
surplus  extraction  from  both  sides  (buyer  power  hypothesis;  see,  for  instance,  von  Ungern-
Sternberg,  1996;  Dobson  and  Waterson,  1997).  This  does  not  seem  to  happen  for  clothes  and 
footwear and for furnishings, household equipment and maintenance, where the negative coefficient 
indicates  a  more  effective  pass-through.  In  these  sectors,  the  convergence  towards  a  higher 
concentration at the buying group level has been associated with negative price dynamics and the 
countervailing hypothesis seems to be satisfied.  
The relation between the concentration index computed at the store level and price dynamics 
is  confirmed  to  be  positive  and  statistically  significant  for  alcohol  and  tobacco  and  for 
miscellaneous goods and services (at 5 per cent and 10 per cent statistical confidence, respectively; 
column  4  in  Table  7).  Instead,  it  loses  significance  for  the  first  COICOP  category,  probably 
reflecting the dominating effect of the buying group concentration measure. The HHIS is negatively 
related to price changes for COICOP categories 3 and 5. Also, in this case the sign is reversed for 
clothing and footwear and furnishings, household equipment and maintenance. Note that the reason 
for this discrepancy at the store level may be imputed to the fact that these are residual products, 
only sold in hypermarkets and (in a few cases) in larger supermarkets, so that the correlation could 
be spurious. Another possible explanation is a composition effect: clothes and footwear sold in non-
specialized retailers are generally lower quality products compared with their substitutes sold in 
specialized  stores.  A  higher  concentration  at  the  store  level  may  have  stimulated  higher 
consumption of these low price-low quality products, so that we observe a parallel negative trend of 
price change due to the composition effect in consumers’ expenditure. A full assessment of this 
issue would require further investigation, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
4.1 Robustness check 
 
Our results are robust when we consider model (7) substituting the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at 
the buying group level with the one at the parent company, while keeping the store concentration 
measure.
16  
                                                 
16 This is expected, given the correlation between the HHIB and HHIG previously pointed out.   17 
We repeat the analysis using the HHI constructed at the local level (5 km and 10 km radius). 
In this case, the correlation among HHIB, HHIP and HHIS rises to 0.9; therefore the three indices 
are observationally equivalent and model (6) reduces to: 
ijt i i it ijt HHIS DuCOICOP Ducountry Duyear X e b b b b b p + + + + + = * 4 3 2 1 0   (8) 
The main results of the regression based on the indices computed at the local level are 
summarized  in  Table  8.  The  coefficient  associated  with  the  HHI  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level for food and beverages and at 1 per cent for alcohol and tobacco 
and for miscellaneous goods and services. It is negative and statistically significant for clothing and 
footwear and furnishings, household equipment and maintenance. Given the high correlation among 
the three levels, it is indifferent to consider the index at the buying group, at the parent company or 
at the shop level. For the same reason, the intensity of the HHIS coefficients provided in Table 8 
can be compared with column 4 in Table 7 only. 
We conduct several further robustness checks of the model. We include different measures 
of wealth in the vector of controls (regional GDP, growth rate of real value added, etc.). We also 
repeat the analysis on a country by country basis, investigating the specific dynamics of the two 
“extreme”  countries  in  the  sample:  Finland  (the  most  concentrated)  and  Portugal  (the  least 
concentrated). When controlling for individual market structure characteristics and excluding the 
outliers the main results of the pooled analysis are left unchanged.  
5. Concluding remarks and possible extensions 
 
The relationship between market structure and price levels and dynamics has fostered two 
economic strands of literature. On one side the industrial organization contributions find that a more 
competitive market structure implies lower prices and enhances consumer welfare. On the other 
side, the macroeconomic theory strand analyses the relationship between the frequency of price 
adjustments and the degree of monopoly power and finds a positive relation between the absence of 
price changes and monopoly power and, conversely, between a high frequency of price changes and 
the degree of competition.  
We  investigated  the  relationship  between  market  structure  (in  terms  of  equilibrium 
concentration outcomes) and price dynamics in six euro-area countries. The analysis has looked at 
the buying group, parent company and individual store level concentration for five major categories 
of grocery products in the 12 COICOP aggregation. By using a unique database containing both 
regional year-on-year percentage price changes and concentration measures, we show that these 
price changes are positively affected by the degree of concentration for food and beverages, alcohol   18 
and tobacco and miscellaneous goods and services, while the relation reverses its sign for clothing 
and  footwear,    furnishings,  and  household  equipment  and  maintenance.  The  estimation  method 
takes into account cross-country differences in the retail market structure and is conducted using the 
regional as well as the local HHI.  
A very important policy implication of the findings of this paper seems to be that there are 
important non-monetary determinants of price levels and short-run dynamics, which are not under 
direct control of the monetary authorities, but depend on how specific markets work (and on how 
far they  are from the ideal benchmark of perfect competition).  In a broader context, the study 
appears to suggest that, at least in the short run, appropriate competition-enhancing policies may 
facilitate the challenges posed to the monetary authorities in preserving price stability. 
A  possible  extension  of  the  analysis  could  be  to  test  for  the  impact  of  competition  on 
inflation volatility. Another interesting issue could be the use of detailed price levels in conjunction 
with structural Nielsen data which varies over time to assess the effect of concentration of price 













Table 1: Description of the Nielsen structural dataset (July 2010) 
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IT NL PT
NUTS3 X X X X
NUTS2 X X X X X X X
Sales area X X X X X X X X X
Counters X X X X
Turnover share X X X X
Buying group X X X X X X X X X X
Parental group X X X X X X X X X X
Store  X X X X X X X X X X
Obs 4,999 3,725 32,216 16,269 2,827 17,682 3,033 29,482 4,375 3,932









Table 2: HHI at the buying group and parent company level in the retail sector by country 
Country HHI - BG Country HHI - PG
IT 12.8 IT 5.8
FR 15.1 FR 7.9
PT 15.8 AT 8.2
ES 19.9 ES 9.5
GR 21.2 GR 11.0
NL 21.4 NL 12.1
BE 22.5 PT 13.2
DE 24.7 BE 19.0
AT 25.2 DE 21.6
FI 37.9 FI 31.0
EA avg 19.4 EA avg 12.6
Notes: BG denotes buying group; PG denotes 
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Table 3: Market share by country and buying group 
 
Country Buying group (BG) market share Country Buying group (BG) market share
1st BG 34.4% 8th BG 3.0%
2nd BG 33.1% 9th BG 2.1%
3rd BG 10.7% 10th BG 1.2%
4th BG 7.0% 11th BG 1.1%
5th BG 5.8% 12th BG 1.1%
6th BG 4.7% 13th BG 0.7%
7th BG 3.9% 14th BG 0.3%
8th BG 0.4% 15th BG 0.1%
1st BG 35.6% 1st BG 21.6%
2nd BG 21.7% 2nd BG 18.0%
3rd BG 16.9% 3rd BG 11.2%
4th BG 10.5% 4th BG 11.2%
5th BG 9.1% 5th BG 11.0%
6th BG 6.3% 6th BG 8.2%
1st BG 36.3% 7th BG 4.1%
2nd BG 26.7% 8th BG 3.5%
3rd BG 13.7% 9th BG 2.7%
4th BG 12.8% 10th BG 2.4%
5th BG 9.6% 11th BG 2.2%
6th BG 0.9% 12th BG 1.9%
7th BG 0.1% 13th BG 1.7%
1st BG 28.5% 14th BG 0.4%
2nd BG 20.1% 1st BG 31.8%
3rd BG 19.3% 2nd BG 27.1%
4th BG 17.9% 3rd BG 14.8%
5th BG 7.4% 4th BG 8.0%
6th BG 4.9% 5th BG 7.6%
7th BG 2.0% 6th BG 6.8%
1st BG 45.9% 7th BG 2.7%
2nd BG 38.9% 8th BG 0.7%
3rd BG 12.8% 9th BG 0.5%
4th BG 2.4% 1st BG 24.5%
1st BG 25.5% 2nd BG 21.4%
2nd BG 16.1% 3rd BG 13.4%
3rd BG 13.8% 4th BG 11.0%
4th BG 13.2% 5th BG 9.6%
5th BG 9.7% 6th BG 9.0%
6th BG 9.5% 7th BG 6.0%
7th BG 5.3% 8th BG 2.5%
8th BG 3.9% 9th BG 1.1%
9th BG 2.8% 10th BG 0.9%
10th BG 0.4% 11th BG 0.3%
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Table 4: Market share by country and parental group 
 
Country Parental Group (PG) market share Country Parental Group (PG)market share Country Parental Group (PG) market share
1st PG 14.9% 1st PG 15.7% 1st PG 27.1%
2nd PG 11.1% 2nd PG 12.0% 2nd PG 11.2%
3rd PG 10.7% 3rd PG 9.9% 3rd PG 10.1%
4th PG 8.4% 4th PG 8.6% 4th PG 8.0%
5th PG 8.4% 5th PG 8.6% 5th PG 7.6%
6th PG 6.5% 6th PG 8.3% 6th PG 6.8%
7th PG 6.5% 7th PG 5.1% 7th PG 4.7%
8th PG 5.8% 8th PG 4.2% 8th PG 3.6%
9th PG 5.0% 9th PG 3.9% 9th PG 3.6%
10th PG 5.0% 10th PG 3.3% 10th PG 2.7%
11th PG 4.7% 11th PG 3.1% 11th PG 2.4%
12th PG 4.0% 12th PG 2.8% 12th PG 1.9%
13th PG 3.9% 13th PG 2.7% 13th PG 1.7%
14th PG 1.0% 14th PG 2.6% 14th PG 1.6%
15th PG 0.9% 15th PG 2.5% 15th PG 1.5%
16th PG 0.9% 16th PG 1.1% 16th PG 1.1%
17th PG 0.6% 17th PG 1.1% 17th PG 1.0%
18th PG 0.6% 18th PG 0.7% 18th PG 0.9%
19th-21st PG 1.2% 19th PG 0.6% 19th PG 0.9%
1st PG 31.7% 20th PG-47th PG 3.0% 20th PG 0.7%
2nd PG 19.3% 1st PG 25.8% 21th PG-22th PG 0.9%
3rd PG 15.0% 2nd PG 9.6% 1st PG 20.7%
4th PG 9.3% 3rd PG 8.8% 2nd PG 17.7%
5th PG 8.1% 4th PG 8.3% 3rd PG 11.3%
6th PG 5.6% 5th PG 7.8% 4th PG 9.3%
1st PG 33.0% 6th PG 6.7% 5th PG 8.1%
2nd PG 23.5% 7th PG 5.1% 6th PG 7.6%
3rd PG 14.5% 8th PG 4.0% 7th PG 2.1%
4th PG 12.2% 9th PG 3.8% 8th PG 1.5%
5th PG 1.6% 10th PG 2.9% 9th PG 1.4%
6th PG 1.3% 11th PG 2.8% 10th PG 0.9%
7th PG 0.8% 12th PG 2.2% 11th PG 0.8%
8th PG 0.8% 13th PG 2.0% 12th PG-31th PG 3.5%
1st PG 21.6% 14th PG 2.0%
2nd PG 13.9% 15th PG 1.4%
3rd PG 13.3% 16th PG 0.8%
4th PG 5.6% 17th PG 0.7%
5th PG 4.7% 18th PG 0.7%
6th PG 3.7% 19th PG-27th PG 1.7%
7th PG 3.6% 1st PG 11.1%
8th PG 2.4% 2nd PG 10.2%
9th PG 2.1% 3rd PG 8.4%
10th PG 1.5% 4th PG 7.8%
11th PG 1.5% 5th PG 6.7%
12th PG 1.4% 6th PG 5.3%
13th PG 1.3% 7th PG 4.6%
14th PG 1.3% 8th PG 4.1%
15th PG 1.3% 9th PG 3.8%
16th PG 1.2% 10th PG 3.5%
17th PG 1.1% 11th PG 3.3%
18th PG 1.0% 12th PG 3.0%
19th PG 1.0% 13th PG 2.6%
20th PG 0.8% 14th PG 2.5%
21th PG 0.7% 15th PG 2.3%
22th PG 0.6% 16th PG 2.1%
23th PG 0.6% 17th PG 2.0%
24th PG 0.6% 18th PG 1.8%
25th PG 0.6% 19th PG 1.7%
26th-186th PG 11.2% 20th PG 1.7%
1st PG 40.4% 21th PG 1.6%
2nd PG 33.9% 22th PG 0.9%
3rd PG 10.4% 23th PG 0.6%
4th PG 0.8% 24th PG-30th PG 1.4%
NL
PT
Notes: The residual market share for Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Finland is represented by independent parental groups
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Table 5: HHI at the NUTS2 level by buying group, parental group and shop. 
Country NUTS2 Buying group Parental group Shop
ABRUZZO 17.03 9.85 0.52
BASILICATA 21.18 14.21 0.73
CALABRIA 13.34 7.81 0.23
CAMPANIA 18.33 9.54 0.15
EMILIA-ROMAGNA 24.84 14.86 0.21
FRIULI-VENEZIA GIULIA 22.29 11.95 0.39
LAZIO 14.20 8.25 0.12
LIGURIA 19.13 11.78 0.38
LOMBARDIA 10.97 6.29 0.12
MARCHE 17.76 12.49 0.35
MOLISE 16.86 11.32 1.98
PIEMONTE 12.33 8.79 0.19
PUGLIA 15.06 8.65 0.16
SARDEGNA 17.00 11.17 0.18
SICILIA 16.20 7.35 0.11
TOSCANA 23.27 15.72 0.28
TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE 30.70 16.65 0.27
UMBRIA 19.24 13.73 0.41
VALLE D'AOSTA 19.16 15.94 11.07
VENETO 14.18 9.56 0.12
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG 25.86 24.68 5.23
BAYERN 28.66 23.82 4.35
BERLIN 21.94 18.03 8.66
BRANDENBURG 24.83 20.79 9.27
BREMEN 26.42 24.73 9.12
HAMBURG 27.91 24.92 8.75
HESSEN 27.27 25.37 5.41
MECKLENBURG-VORPOMMERN 24.56 18.40 7.79
NIEDERSACHSEN 24.95 23.68 5.43
NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 23.67 20.61 4.18
RHEINLAND-PFALZ 23.09 20.80 5.39
SAARLAND 22.26 21.86 8.86
SACHSEN 27.22 25.85 9.29
SACHSEN-ANHALT 32.06 28.07 7.98
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 22.82 18.45 7.44
THÜRINGEN 26.31 23.98 4.49
PROVINCE D'ANVERS 24.89 20.38 6.86
PROVINCE DE FLANDRE-OCCIDENTALE 22.04 18.11 5.90
PROVINCE DE FLANDRE-ORIENTALE 20.55 17.52 6.54
PROVINCE DE HAINAUT 22.79 19.46 7.81
PROVINCE DE LIMBOURG 24.12 19.45 6.35
PROVINCE DE LIÈGE 23.48 19.98 7.13
PROVINCE DE LUXEMBOURG 21.06 19.32 8.96
PROVINCE DE NAMUR 22.52 19.56 7.42
PROVINCE DU BRABANT FLAMAND 24.97 22.16 9.30
PROVINCE DU BRABANT WALLON 31.99 28.97 12.09
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Country NUTS2 Buying group Parental group Shop
ALSACE 15.51 8.90 7.90
AQUITAINE 16.88 11.50 8.89
AUVERGNE 16.71 8.47 6.27
BOURGOGNE 15.56 9.50 6.98
BRETAGNE 18.08 12.58 9.14
CENTRE 15.82 11.06 8.04
CHAMPAGNE-ARDENNES 17.11 10.66 9.08
CORSE 33.68 14.36 13.58
FRANCHE-COMTÉ 13.04 8.33 6.09
ILE-DE-FRANCE 21.33 10.68 8.48
LANGUEDOC-ROUSSILLON 17.59 10.14 6.78
LIMOUSIN 17.78 10.05 6.94
LORRAINE 13.40 9.17 8.22
MIDI-PYRÉNÉES 16.72 10.41 7.48
NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS 19.06 9.30 8.10
NORMANDIE (BASSE-) 21.11 10.38 8.42
NORMANDIE (HAUTE-) 19.42 10.72 9.00
PAYS-DE-LA-LOIRE 19.95 14.57 11.38
PICARDIE 16.27 10.70 8.83
POITOU-CHARENTES 16.97 12.05 9.54
PROVENCE-CÔTE-AZUR 19.10 8.57 7.01
RHÔNE-ALPES 19.22 8.47 6.67
ANDALUCÍA 23.04 11.84 7.69
ARAGÓN 19.66 13.72 10.13
ASTURIAS 24.47 15.18 8.94
BALEARES 29.63 20.86 17.15
CANTABRIA 29.81 15.99 11.77
CASTILLA LA MANCHA 23.66 10.15 7.80
CASTILLA Y LEÓN 22.14 10.98 7.14
CATALUÑA 20.62 10.23 5.95
COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 24.56 13.80 12.13
EXTREMADURA 31.59 17.83 10.53
GALICIA 21.23 14.64 8.98
MADRID 23.90 13.04 7.57
MURCIA 22.42 12.80 10.42
NAVARRA 26.30 22.28 11.27
PAÍS VASCO 29.76 27.64 21.40
RIOJA 27.01 21.54 14.34
DRENTHE 18.31 11.79 6.08
FLEVOLAND 18.65 18.90 8.52
FRIESLAND (NL) 20.93 12.24 8.77
GELDERLAND 21.04 12.41 6.16
GRONINGEN 18.45 15.33 8.54
LIMBURG (NL) 22.27 14.12 8.99
NOORD-BRABANT 21.30 14.07 8.41
NOORD-HOLLAND 30.34 15.26 10.48
OVERIJSSEL 22.36 11.96 7.01
UTRECHT 23.01 14.38 8.44
ZEELAND 27.01 14.51 6.67
ZUID-HOLLAND 22.39 16.88 10.12
ALENTEJO 17.13 14.50 9.38
ALGARVE 16.81 13.95 8.36
CENTRO 15.59 13.36 7.63
LISBOA 16.22 13.49 9.70
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Country NUTS2 Buying group Parental group Shop
AHVENANMAA 74.78 61.31 11.93
ITÄ-SUOMI 41.95 35.40 0.76
LÄNSI-SUOMI 38.02 29.49 0.68
MUU ETELÄ-SUOMI 37.11 32.53 0.57
POHJOIS-SUOMI 37.12 29.09 0.77
UUSIMAAT 37.57 31.88 0.54
BURGENLAND 26.52 8.64 6.59
KÄRNTEN 32.20 10.50 7.44
NIEDERÖSTERREICH 24.96 8.86 7.14
OBERÖSTERREICH 27.17 9.53 6.07
SALZBURG 29.19 8.86 6.63
STEIERMARK 24.95 9.67 6.35
TIROL 28.77 16.81 13.31
VORARLBERG 37.51 11.63 7.89
WIEN 30.08 13.01 12.80
ANATOLIKI MAKEDONIA, THRAKI 34.54 21.23 17.10
ATTIKI 22.84 14.30 9.09
DYTIKI ELLADA 21.94 12.51 9.73
DYTIKI MAKEDONIA 21.83 13.30 10.71
IONIA NISIA 55.41 26.46 26.46
IPEIROS 18.27 9.64 7.94
KENTRIKI MAKEDONIA 24.00 15.46 14.17
KRITI 31.29 17.82 15.73
NOTIO AIGAIO 88.83 42.09 42.09
PELOPONNISOS 22.57 13.02 7.12
STEREA ELLADA 26.54 15.71 13.28
THESSALIA 23.93 13.16 11.74
VOREIO AIGAIO 50.00 28.60 28.60






Table 6: Overview of geo-coding results 
Building/
Address
EA 75.6 14.2 9.1 0.8 0.2 100
BE 90 6.8 3.2 - - 100
DE 98.3 1.6 0.1 0 - 100
GR 25.8 10.2 27.9 28.4 7.7 100
ES 62.5 22.1 15.3 0.1 - 100
FR 50.5 34.1 15.4 0 - 100
IT 74 16.7 9.2 0.1 - 100
NL 91.8 1.6 6.6 0 - 100
AT 96 0.2 3.8 0 - 100
PT 45 20.6 32.9 1.5 - 100
SI 68.6 23.9 7.5 0 - 100
SK 35.3 53.7 0.7 10.3 - 100
FI 88.1 8.4 3.5 0 - 100
Sources: bulkgeocoder.com 
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Table 7: Effect of regional level concentration on year-on-year sectoral price changes. 
 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
HHI*food 0.007* 0.004 0.009 0.014
HHI*alco 0.054*** 0.018 0.114** 0.045
HHI*clot -0.027*** 0.006 -0.046*** 0.015
HHI*hous -0.010* 0.006 -0.020* 0.013




Local labour cost 
Density
Obs.
Source: Our calculation from Nielsen data, CPI (national statistics) and Eurostat.
Notes: Dependent variable is the yearly change in the sectoral price index. HHI=Herfindahl-



































Source: Our calculation from Nielsen data, CPI (national 
statistics) and Eurostat.
Notes: Dependent variable is the yearly change in the 
sectoral price index. HHI=Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. 
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